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The Direct and Collateral Estoppel Effects
of Alternative Holdings
Jo Desha Lucast
Under long accepted principles, a valid final judgment on the
merits bars a subsequent suit on the same cause of action by a
party or a person privy1 to the record.2 In addition, such a judg-
ment estops parties and their privies from relitigating in a subse-
quent action an issue that was (1) actually litigated and deter-
mined,8 if (2) the determination was essential to the judgment,4
and (3) the person against whom the estoppel is pleaded had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 5 Applying these princi-
ples, courts generally have held that a determination that does not
logically support the judgment is not essential and may be reliti-
gated in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action.' This
principle has been rested on a number of grounds. The first is that
a finding of fact or the determination of an issue that does not
t Arnold I. Shure Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments avoids the term "privity" in favor of the
concept of "representation." See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS at 13-14 & § 63
(1980). For present purposes, however, the distinction is irrelevant. See J. MOORE & T. CUR-
RmR, 1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.41111] (2d ed. 1982), for a general discussion of
privity and mutuality.
2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27, 29 (1980).
3 Id. § 27; see J. MOORS & T. CURRIER, supra note 1, 0.443[3].
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980); see J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra
note 1, 1 0.443[5].
The "full and fair opportunity" principle originates, in the federal courts, in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971). Some ele-
ment of fair opportunity to litigate is a necessary ingredient of procedural due process, but
the Supreme Court has indicated that "full and fair opportunity," as applied in the federal
courts to mark the limits of collateral estoppel invoked by a stranger to the first litigation,
extends beyond this minimum. In Paridane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), the
Court permitted the offensive use of collateral estoppel by a stranger to the first litigation,
but noted that offensive use of collateral estoppel is inappropriate where the party seeking
to use the prior judgment offensively could easily have joined the earlier action or where
collateral estoppel would be unfair to the party against whom the prior judgment is sought
to be used. Id. at 329-33. Cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-83 (1982),
in which the Court drew a distinction between a federal district court's discretion to reject
collateral estoppel as unfair in the case of judgments rendered in the federal courts and its
duty under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) to apply the state law of res judicata and estoppel in the
case of judgments rendered by the state courts.
I J. MooRs & T. CURRIER, supra note 1, 0.443[5].
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support the judgment is not a part of the court's judgment, but
analogous to a dictum.7 The second is that a nonessential finding is
unreliable because it may have been made with less scrutiny than
it would have received if the result had depended upon it.s Third,
such findings generally are not appealable."
Cases involving nonessential findings have been distinguished
from those in which a judgment is supported by two or more deter-
minations, each of which itself would be sufficient. Judgments rest-
ing on independently sufficient determinations arise in a number
of circumstances. First, the plaintiff may pitch a single claim for
relief on two or more legal theories, any one of which might justify
the relief, and make his case on more than one.1 Second, the
plaintiff might plead more than one instance of conduct giving rise
to the claim and prove them all.1 Third, there are cases in which,
The analogy is not complete. A judgment applies the law to the facts as determined.
A statement unrelated to the facts is in the nature of an abstract proposition. But the facts
must be determined before the law can be applied to them, and so they can be characterized
as unnecessary only by virtue of hindsight; their determination was necessary to arrive at a
judgment, but as determined they do not support that judgment.
s See Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926). Whether any such
general inference is proper is open to question. Often the thoroughness with which particu-
lar issues have been exposed and considered can be determined from the record and the
court's opinion, and the limitation of estoppel to such determinations as support the judg-
ment may reflect to some extent the assumption that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to
be mechanically applied except in the case of some categorical exception. After the decision
in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), this
assumption is questionable. But the requirement that the finding be necessary to the judg-
ment has been consistently adhered to. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 326 n.5 (1979).
' Normally a party may not appeal from a judgment in his favor to review findings he
believes to be erroneous but which are not necessary to support the decree. See J. MooRS &
T. CURRIER, supra note 1, 1 0.443[5], at 3923-25. But when this general proposition is used
to support the principle that such a finding may not be used to support a collateral estoppel,
it has a certain chicken/egg aspect: if the finding is not conclusive, the prevailing party is
not a party aggrieved and, therefore, has no standing to appeal; if the prevailing party can
appeal, the finding should be deemed conclusive. Cf. Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas &
Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939) (holding that defendant could appeal from a decree holding
plaintiff's patent valid but not infringed, appeal being allowed for the limited purpose of
reforming the decree to eliminate the portion holding the patent valid); United Aircraft
Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 1971) (applying collateral estoppel to a determina-
tion of the NLRB adverse to the prevailing party but as to which the prevailing party could
have obtained review).
10 See, e.g., Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964, 980-87
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
11 For example, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (re-
pealed 1978), the petitioner might allege two or more acts of bankruptcy, any of which, if
proved, would suffice.
In suits for injunctions, separate acts have been considered as cumulative rather than
independently sufficient. See, e.g., Tanker Hygrade No. 18, Inc. v. United States, 526 F.2d
[50:701
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to prevail, the plaintiff must establish two distinct elements of his
claim, and he establishes neither.1" Fourth, the defendant may
deny the allegations of the complaint and also raise an affirmative
defense, or plead more than one compatible defense and prevail on
two or more such issues."3
There is a surface analogy between such independently suffi-
cient determinations and those that are not essential to the judg-
ment. Each determination, taken alone, is not essential to the
judgment in one sense of the word, for a contrary decision of any
one singly would not alter the outcome. But with respect to the
reasons for denying preclusive effect to nonessential determina-
tions, they differ on all three scores. The analogy to stare decisis
fails; multiple grounds for decision are not dicta. Since each dispo-
sition is dispositive independently, there is no reason why the par-
ties, the judge, or the jury might be expected to regard it as unim-
portant or give it less than its due measure of scrutiny.14 Moreover,
all of the determinations are reviewable on appeal. Thus, under
traditional principles, a judgment resting on two or more indepen-
dently sufficient grounds precludes relitigation of any of them.1 5
For two reasons in combination, the question of collateral es-
toppel to preclude relitigation of findings independently sufficient
to support a judgment has not, until recent years, produced very
much litigation.16 A relatively broad concept of cause of action and
the compulsory counterclaim rules limit sharply the circumstances
in which the issue can arise in subsequent litigation between the
parties, and so long as most jurisdictions adhered to the require-
ment of mutuality of collateral estoppel, a stranger to the litigation
could rarely plead it. 17 This paper addresses recent developments
805, 810-12 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (a decision based on the cumulative effect of several oil spills
precludes relitigation of individual spills), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976).
12 The illustration given in RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 comment n, illustration 8
(1942), is the case in which a judgment is rendered for the defendant in a personal injury
action on specific findings that defendant was not negligent and plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence.
iS There are many theoretical examples, as the defendant will often deny the allega-
tions of the complaint and interpose one or more affirmative defenses.
14 See Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 617-23 (1948).
25 See, e.g., Trone v. Smith (In re Westgate-California Corp.), 642 F.2d 1174, 1176-77
(9th Cir. 1981); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1978); Williams v. Ward, 556
F.2d 1143, 1154 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Irving Nat'l Bank v. Law, 10
F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1926); First Nat'l Bank v. Covington, 129 F. 792, 797 (C.C.E.D. Ky.
1903), aff'd, 198 U.S. 100 (1905); 420 Mining Co. v. Bullion Mining Co., 9 F. Cas. 592, 597-
600 (C.C.D. Nev. 1876) (No. 4989).
"8 See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 107 n.4 (2d Cir. 1970).
17 The Restatement (Second) abandons the concept of a "cause of action" and applies
1983]
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regarding the effect of alternative holdings on subsequent litigation
involving one or both parties to the original suit.
I. HALPERN V. SCHWARTZ
In 1970, in Halpern v. Schwartz,18 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reexamined the question of estoppel by a judg-
ment supported by more than one independently sufficient finding
and concluded that in such a case neither finding should afford the
basis for a collateral estoppel.1"
The first proceeding in the Halpern case was on a petition to
adjudicate man and wife involuntary bankrupts. The respondents
were shareholders in a family business, and the petition charged
that the assignment of a mortgage and bond to the respondents'
son constituted an act of bankruptcy under two separate subsec-
tions"0 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1 Under one of these it was
unnecessary to prove actual intent to defraud creditors. Under the
other, proof of such intent was required.22 The wife did not testify
the doctrine of bar to the same "claim." The term "claim" is defined to include "all rights of
the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transac-
tion, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980). The term "transaction, or series of connected transac-
tions" is left "to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as
whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expec-
tations or business understanding or usage." Id. § 24(2). Although the federal courts have,
perhaps, not gone as far, the trend toward a broader concept of "claim" in the context of
bar and merger has been noted by the Supreme Court. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971).
The transactional theory of a claim has been a feature of the compulsory counterclaim
rule since its promulgation in 1939. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
The requirement of mutuality as a condition to collateral estoppel was not abandoned
by the Supreme Court until 1971 in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories. The Court did not give
specific sanction of affirmative use of collateral estoppel by a stranger to the prior litigation
until 1979 in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
-6 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
29 Id. at 106.
20 The petitioners alleged that the respondents
(1) conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed valuable property with intent to hin-
der, delay and defraud their creditors (an act of bankruptcy under section 3a(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act ["Act"], 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1)); and (2) transferred valuable property
while insolvent to creditors with the intent to prefer such creditors over others of the
same class (an act of bankruptcy under section 3a(2) of the Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(a)(2),
96).
426 F.2d at 103.
" Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
22 Strictly speaking, § 3a(1) of the amended Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not require
proof of intent to defraud. That provision, as codified, referred to "having (1) concealed...
or removed any part of [the bankrupt's] property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
HeinOnline  -- 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 704 1983
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or appear at the trial. The court heard testimony, including the
testimony of the husband, and found that an act of bankruptcy
had taken place on three statutory grounds.23 The respondents
were adjudicated bankrupts and the case was referred. The respon-
dents took joint appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient
to establish the transfer, but did not argue the issue of intent. The
court of appeals affirmed from the bench without opinion. 4
Four years later, the wife applied for a discharge. The trustee
moved for summary judgment denying discharge, contending that
the earlier finding that the bankrupts had removed assets of the
estate with the intent to delay collection put the issue of discharge
beyond triable issue of fact. The district court granted the motion,
and the wife appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the first judgment did not estop the wife from denying intent in
the discharge proceeding because the previous findings of an act of
bankruptcy independent of intent under two subsections made the
determination of intent unnecessary to the judgment.2 5
Judge Smith took occasion to review the cases espousing the
doctrine that independently sufficient determinations made in sup-
port of a judgment are each conclusive, found the doctrine not so
firmly established as to preclude reexamination, and on the merits
found it wanting. First, he found persuasive the analogy to deter-
minations that are "incidental, collateral or immaterial" to the
judgment.26 Since in neither case does the relief depend upon the
determination, there is a risk of substandard consideration of indi-
vidual grounds. In the particular case, for example, he questioned
whether, in view of the two grounds for treating the transfer as an
his creditors or any of them, or made or suffered a transfer of any of his property, fraudu-
lent under the provisions of section 107 or 110 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1) (1976)
(repealed 1978). Under § 107, which dealt with fraudulent transfers, the transfer could have
been fraudulent without proof of intent to defraud. See id. § 107(d). Nevertheless, the peti-
tion charged the first alternative under § 3a(1). Section 3a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(2) (1976)
(repealed 1978), dealt with preferences and required intent to prefer, but did not require
proof of specific intent to defraud.
" According to the Second Circuit, the district court found the assignment to be an act
of bankruptcy because
(1) it was a removal of property with intent to hinder and delay creditors under section
3a(1) of the Act; (2) it was a transfer of property under section 3a(1), fraudulent as to
creditors as defined in section 67 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2); and (3) it was a
preferential transfer of property under section 3a(2) as defined in section 60 of the Act,
11 U.S.C. § 96.
426 F.2d at 103.
" In re Halpern, Nos. 29704-05 (2d Cir. June 10, 1965) (affirmed without opinion).
Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d at 108.
26 Id. at 105.
1983]
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act of bankruptcy independent of intent, the district judge gave
the issue of the wife's intent the scrutiny it would have received
had it been a linchpin to the relief 27
Second, although he conceded that all independent grounds
for a judgment are reviewable on appeal, he thought that in cases
decided on the basis of more than one independently sufficient de-
termination the losing party might be deterred from seeking review
of any particular ground when affirmance of the judgment on an
alternative ground appears probable.2 8 He took the effect of affirm-
ance on one ground without reaching the other to be in some
doubt.29
Even in cases in which there is an appeal, he believed that
adequate review of any particular determination might be de-
terred. In the Halpern case itself, he pointed out, the necessity to
resist all three determinations on appeal apparently led the re-
spondents to concentrate on the argument that the transfer did
not take place, since this defense would relate to all three grounds
for the judgment.30 He also suggested that appellate consideration
of a particular ground might be affected by want of the usual ad-
versary presentation because the appellee might be expected to
concentrate on the strongest basis for affirmance or the cumulative
nature of the grounds. 1
Further, he argued that in cases in which one ground is unas-
sailable, the traditional rule would encourage appeals for the sole
purpose of forestalling the pleading of an estoppel in collateral liti-
gation. Judge Smith found such appeals undesirable, for they place
a present burden on appellate courts in exchange for speculative
savings in the time of courts of first instance, since, after all, collat-
eral litigation might not arise.32
27 Id.
2a Id. at 105-06.
" The Restatement (Second) takes the position that in the case in which the judgment
is appealed and the appellate court affirms on one ground and does not reach the other, the
judgment constitutes a basis for collateral estoppel only on the ground on which the affirm-
ance rests. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment o (1980). This view has
support in the federal cases. See, e.g., Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607
F.2d 885, 893-98 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Stebbins v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 934, 936-38 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976). Com-
ment o does not deal, however, with the case in which the judgment is affirmed without
opinion.
30 426 F.2d at 106-07.
31 Id. at 106 & n.2.
32 Id. at 106.
[50:701
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II. HALPERN V. SCHWARTZ AND THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
In 1977, when Tentative Draft No. 4 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments3 was published, Halpern v. Schwartz3 4 repre-
sented the most recent judicial examination of the question of the
effect of judgments resting on independently sufficient grounds,
and the reporters found themselves "persuaded by its reasoning, ' '35
which they applied both to the doctrine of bar (claim preclusion in
the parlance of the new Restatement) and to the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel (issue preclusion).
A. The Doctrine of Bar
Section 19 of the Restatement (Second) states the conven-
tional rule that "[a] valid and final personal judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the
same claim." 6 Section 20 states a number of exceptions to this
general proposition. Subsection (1) of section 20 lists a number of
classes of dismissals ordinarily viewed as not disposing of the claim
on the merits.38 Subsection (2) provides:
A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which
rests on the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff's fail-
ure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not bar another ac-
tion by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has matured, or
the precondition has been satisfied, unless a second action is
precluded by operation of the substantive law."
Comment (e) to section 20 applies the Halpern reasoning to
indicate that a dismissal by a court of first instance based upon
two or more determinations, at least one of which, standing alone,
would not render the judgment a bar to another action on the
same claim, should not operate as a bar.40 This principle is illus-
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
" 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
35 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i, reporter's note (1980).
36 Id. § 19.
37 Id. § 20. The Restatement (Second) abandons the concept of a judgment "on the
merits." See id. § 19 comment a. Instead, it states the rule of bar baldly in § 19, and then
states exceptions in § 20. See id. § 19 comment a. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 48
(1942) (stating that judgment on the merits for defendant bars plaintiff from maintaining
another action on the original cause of action).
33 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1) (1980). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (the
effect of involuntary dismissal generally is the same as that of judgment on the merits un-
less dismissal is without prejudice).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(2) (1980).
40 Id. § 20 comment e, reporter's note.
1983]
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trated by the case in which A sues B for breach of contract and the
court enters judgment for B after determining (1) that the contract
is unenforceable because not in writing, (2) in any event B was
induced to enter into the contract by A's fraud, and (3) the action
is premature because the time for B's performance has not yet ar-
rived.41 The effect of the same determination made by an appellate
court is left in some doubt.42
The position of the Restatement (Second) at least conceivably
derives from the treatment of a judgment for the defendant based
both on want of jurisdiction of the subject matter and on the mer-
its. In those circumstances the judgment does not bar a new suit in
another jurisdiction. This rule is logical and uncontroversial, for
the unappealed determination of want of jurisdiction renders the
determination of the merits subject to collateral attack.43 The case
41 Id. § 20 comment e, illustration 4.
42 If the judgment resting on alternative determinations discussed in the preceding par-
agraph is that of an appellate court, the question whether it bars another action on the
same claim is a difficult one. See the discussion of an analogous question on [sic] the
context of issue preclusion, § 27, Comments i and o. But in any event, the judgment
should not operate as a bar if one of the determinations is that the court in which the
action was brought lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the
claim.
Id. § 20 comment e. Such cases might be inordinately rare.
43 Cf. International Philanthropic Hosp. Found. v. United States, 621 F.2d 402,405 (Ct.
Cl. 1980), where a dismissal by a district court with prejudice on a finding of want of juris-
diction of the subject matter was read by the Court of Claims as meaning with prejudice to
refiling in the district court, and McLean v. Cowen & Co., 660 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1981), in
which Judge Lumbard expressed the opinion that a judgment dismissing plaintiff's action
pleaded under federal law with a pendent claim under state law was void insofar as it pur-
ported to dismiss the pendent claim on the merits. He proceeded on the theory that a fed-
eral court that dismisses the federal claim before trial and before it has committed substan-
tial time and effort to the state law claim is without subject matter jurisdiction to dispose of
the state law claim on the merits. Id. at 848-49. Judge Lasker disagreed, but concurred in
the result on the ground that relief could be based on FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 660 F.2d at
849, 851. Judge Meskill dissented. Id. at 852. The McLearn case illustrates the point that
the distinction between a jurisdictional dismissal and one on the merits is not always with-
out difficulty.
A judgment on the merits joined with a determination of improper venue or want of
jurisdiction of the person may lead to different results. The defendant can waive objection
to these defects, see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), and the plaintiff,
having chosen the time and place for judgment, should not be heard to complain about the
judgment he gets. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), objections to personal jurisdiction and venue
may be made by motion or in the answer, but whichever way they are made they are usually
disposed of in advance of trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In some states, such objection
must be made prior to answer. See, e.g., Code of Civil Procedure § 2-104(b), ILL. RE V. STAT.
ch. 110, 2-104(b) (1983) (wrong venue, waiver, motion to transfer); id. § 2-301, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110, 2-301 (1983) (special appearance). In the federal practice, it is possible to
present in a single motion objections to jurisdiction or venue and objection for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted. When this is done, and the motion is granted,
[50:701
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of a defense of failure to perform conditions precedent, where the
condition is a statutory precondition to suit, is closely analogous to
the case where lack of subject matter jurisdiction is shown, for a
finding of failure to satisfy the statutory precondition is a finding
that the suit cannot be maintained. Moreover, judgment for the
defendant based upon failure to satisfy the precondition and upon
the merits has the same contradictory character as has a judgment
on the merits where the court lacks jurisdiction to determine the
merits."'
The defense of failure to satisfy a substantive condition to lia-
bility (i.e., the defense of prematurity) differs, however, from the
subject matter jurisdiction defense. The prematurity defense goes
to the present existence of a cause of action, not to the power of
the court to render a judgment on the action, should one exist. A
consideration of the procedural treatment of these defenses will
help explain the shortcomings of the Restatement (Second) posi-
tion regarding the doctrine of bar in cases where a finding of pre-
maturity is coupled with other independently sufficient bases of
judgment.
The procedural system, and indeed the doctrines of bar and
estoppel, are guided by concerns for fairness and efficiency. Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant may raise in
his answer as many defenses, legal or equitable, as he may care to
interpose, but affirmative defenses must be pleaded.45 Certain de-
fenses, at the option of the pleader, may be raised by motion prior
to answer,46 and these defenses, whether raised by motion or an-
swer, will be heard in advance of trial on request of any party, un-
less the court orders otherwise.47 This procedure obviously contem-
plates that both parties will give notice of their claims and
defenses and that unless fairness or convenience dictate otherwise,
the whole controversy will be settled by one trial and one appeal.48
This end is aided by Rule 41(b) (patterned after the pre-Rules eq-
uity practice), which, with stated exceptions, treats an involuntary
the basis of the dismissal could become a matter of dispute, but a dismissal rested explicitly
on both grounds is unlikely.
44 See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-88 (1961); Stebbins v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 934, 937-38 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946 (1976).
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
46 Id. 12(b).
47 Id. 12(d).
48 Except for those defenses determined on motion or preliminary hearing under Rule
12(b), (d), all issues to be resolved by the trial of contested facts are to be presented at a
single trial unless, under Rule 42(b), the court orders separate trials.
1983]
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dismissal as a judgment on the- merits unless the court specifies
that it is without prejudice.49
When one defense is temporary in nature and another will bar
the underlying claim, it would be possible to require that the less
preclusive defense be tried first and, if successful, that the more
inclusive defense be left for determination in another suit on an-
other day. In some cases this would conserve judicial resources, for
the parties might settle their differences before that day arrived,
and if they did, the court would not have to address what would
usually be the more complex issues. But any saving that would be
made in such cases would have to be balanced off against the time
consumed in successive appeals. In the Restatement illustration,50
for example, if the trial court decided the issue of prematurity and
declined to address the issues of statute of frauds and fraud, and
the plaintiff appealed, reversal by the appellate court would return
the case for trial of the pretermitted issue, and the judgment after
trial would in turn be appealable.5 1
A different way to deal with sequential defenses would be to
require trial of all issues and then entry of judgment on one
ground at a time, but this scheme would be even more at odds with
efficiency, for it would invite successive appeals without any com-
pensating saving. Ideally, then, if a finding of prematurity would
4 FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b). The stated exceptions are "a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19." Id. As we have seen,
dismissal for failure to satisfy a statutory precondition to suit has been held to be a dismis-
sal for "lack of jurisdiction" for purposes of Rule 41(b). See Costello v. United States, 365
U.S. 265, 285 (1961). There is language in Costello suggesting that other bases for dismissal,
that, like prematurity, do not address the merits might also be so considered. Id. at 285-86.
It is extremely risky, however, to forgo an appeal on the assumption that a judgment on the
merits within the literal terms of Rule 41(b) will not bar a second action. See, e.g., Cemer v.
Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1978); Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795,
798-800 (5th Cir. 1970).
50 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
" In the case of dismissals under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), of course, this is the practice.
52 In this connection it should be noted that the Restatement (Second) formulation
addresses solely the question of the effect of the judgment when it is based on two grounds.
It does not deal with the case in which the court bases the judgment on one ground and
declines to reach the other. Thus in the Restatement (Second) illustration there exists the
possibility that the court might render its judgment solely on the ground either of the stat-
ute of frauds or fraud in the inducement and indicate that since the contract was unenforce-
able ab initio there is no necessity to determine whether the time for performance has ar-
rived. Unless this would be reversible error, the Restatement (Second) rule on multiple
grounds serves only as an aid to interpreting the judgment, permitting the plaintiff to read
it, so to speak, in mitiori sensu. The time for appeal is short, and the consequences of
failing to appeal are drastic. See, most recently, Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394 (1981), which held that res judicata bars relitigation of an unappealed adverse
judgment, where other plaintiffs in similar actions against the same defendant successfully
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preclude a judgment on a ground that would bar a second action,
the prematurity issue should be disposed of first, and the court
should not try the merits. But this is not within the design of the
Rules. Prematurity, as such, is not a defense that can be raised by
motion prior to answer,53 unless the prematurity appears on the
face of the complaint. 4 Nor is it a defense that is to be resolved at
a preliminary hearing. 5 If it does not depend upon contested facts,
it can be determined on motion for summary judgment,58 and the
court may order a separate trial on the issue,57 but in the normal
course of events it will be proved at trial along with such other
defenses as may have been raised.'
The fairness and efficiency of this procedure is nowhere more
apparent than in the case posed by the Restatement (Second) il-
lustration above.5 9 The plaintiff sued for breach of contract. The
defendant pleaded three defenses: the statute of frauds, fraud in
the inducement, and prematurity. Raising all three defenses is
appealed judgments against them. See also Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950)
(holding that where plaintiffs had failed to appeal denaturalization judgment, they could
not later file a motion to set aside cancellation of their certificates of naturalization, pursu-
ant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and 58 are meant to simplify the task of
identifying a judgment and its effect. If an action is dismissed with prejudice when it should
be dismissed without prejudice, the error is correctable on appeal. See, e.g., Caldwell v.
Camp, 594 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1979) (reversing a district court's dismissal with
prejudice). The Restatement (Second) rule, therefore, does not serve to simplify identifica-
tion; it complicates the inquiry.
53 Those that can be raised prior to answer include the following: "(1) lack of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4)
insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19." FED. R. Crv. P.
12(b).
" It may be assumed that if prematurity appears from the complaint, the issue can be
raised by motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Oregon-Washington Water Serv. Co. v.
City of Hoquiarn, 29 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1928) (decided under former Equity Rule 29, prior to
the adoption of the FED. R. Civ. P.).
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
5s Id. 56(a), (b).
67 Id. 42(b).
8$ In the Restatement (Second) illustration, this would be almost necessarily so, be-
cause the contract is oral and the question would depend upon proof of its terms. See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 comment e, illustration 4 (1980).
Although the court could dispose of the case on one ground and not reach the other,
disposition on the least important ground is not favored. See, e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.
Inter-Chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945), where the Supreme Court noted a tendency
on the part of the lower courts in patent infringement cases to dispose of the proceedings on
the issue of infringement where possible, without reaching the issue of validity. The Court
noted that the better practice is to reach the more important issue.
5, See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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proper and, indeed, necessary. The plaintiff, in suing for breach
of contract, must necessarily be prepared to meet defenses under
the statute of frauds and based on fraud in the inducement. The
defense that the time for performance has not arrived is in essence
a denial that any breach has taken place. If the plaintiff is willing
to concede this issue, he may move for a voluntary dismissal. 1 If
the issue does not rest on contested facts, he may move for a par-
tial summary judgment.6 2 If justice requires resolution of the issue
ahead of others, he may request a separate trial. 3 If he goes to
trial on all three issues, presents his evidence on all three issues,
and loses on all three issues, he has had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate. If he is dissatisfied with the judgment, he has a right to
appeal, and on appeal he can attack all three grounds for the judg-
ment, or he can concede prematurity and attack the grounds going
to the underlying contract.6 4 There is no unfairness to the plaintiff,
then, in treating the judgment as a bar.
Nor do the reasons assigned in Halpern v. Schwartz and
eo The defenses of fraud and the statute of frauds are affirmative defenses under FED.
R. Civ. P. 8(c). If the defendant had not pleaded them and lost on the issue of prematurity,
he would be cast in judgment and his defenses would be forever lost. If he had omitted the
prematurity defense and lost on the other two defenses, he would be cast in judgment for
damages and would lose his option to perform his duties under the contract.
61 See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
62 See id. 56(c).
63 See id. 42(b).
4 FED. R. App. P. 3(c) provides specifically for identification in the notice of appeal of a
part of the judgment or order.
Account must be taken of the constitutional requirement of a live case or controversy
between the parties. Thus it has been held that in a patent infringement suit in which the
court has determined that there was no infringement and also that the patent was invalid,
and the plaintiff has let the determination of no infringement stand and appealed only from
the portion of the judgment finding the patent invalid, the appeal will be dismissed for
mootness since the defendant has no interest in the outcome. Hall v. U.S. Fiber & Plastics
Corp., 476 F.2d 418, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1973). The court in Hall declined to vacate the finding
of invalidity and indicated that the question of effect as a collateral estoppel under Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories would have to await presentation of the issue in a second suit. Id. at
420. See also Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1942) (once the court finds
against plaintiff on issue of patent infringement, it cannot go on to find in his favor on the
issue of validity because of a lack of case or controversy).
When both determinations are appealed, of course this question does not arise. See,
e.g., Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Inter-Chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945), in which the
district court found no infringement and that the patent was invalid, the court of appeals
reversed, holding the patent valid and infringed, and the Supreme Court in turn reversed
the court of appeals, holding the patent invalid. Although in cases like Hall and Cover the
defendants can be said to have no continuing interest in the validity of the patent, it can
hardly be said that the defendant has lost his adversary position on the issues of the validity
and enforceability of the contract in the Restatement (Second) example considered in text.
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found persuasive by the Restatement (Second) reporters" fit the
case. The statute of frauds and fraud in the inducement are not
only affirmative defenses,"' but in pleading the fraud defense, the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particular-
ity.17 Thus both parties and the court are fully aware that the en-
forceability of the contract has been put in issue. The three de-
fenses are wholly distinct and rest on different facts. There is no
chance whatever that the court will decide the statute of frauds
and fraud issues intersticially or treat them as unimportant.68
There appears to be no chance whatever that a plaintiff who
has had his contract declared totally unenforceable under the stat-
ute of frauds, or on a finding of fraud in the inducement, would
forgo an appeal because he fears that the appellate court might
affirm the judgment on the ground of prematurity of the suit and
not reach the other issues.69 Even though the plaintiff, as appel-
lant, would prefer reversal and remand for assessment of damages,
he would seek in the alternative a remand with instructions to va-
cate the findings and dismiss without prejudice. 0
It is also wholly unlikely that the issue of the statute of frauds
and fraud in the inducement would appear in other than an adver-
sary posture on appeal. A defendant who has obtained a judgment
releasing him from the contract could hardly be expected to retreat
on appeal to an argument that the suit was premature. The prema-
turity argument is plainly no more than a fall-back position to
both appellant and appellee.
The Halpern-Restatement (Second) argument on judicial
economy71 is no more convincing. Imposing a bar should not in-
I See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
ss See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c).
s7 Id. 9(b).
Is A judge who could not appreciate the distinction between prematurity and a statute
of frauds or fraud in the inducement could not (to borrow a phrase attributed to the late
President Johnson) "walk and chew gum at the same time." Nor is the distinction one that
could confuse a jury.
11 Despite doubts expressed on the subject in Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105
(2d Cir. 1970), it is probably true that the affirmance of the judgment on the ground of
prematurity, without reaching the issues of the statute of frauds and fraud in the induce-
ment, would have the effect of converting the decision into one that would not bar a new
suit at the proper time. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 934, 936-38
(4th Cir. 1976). But the question of the interpretation of the decision of the appellate court
apart, there is no conceivable doubt about the power of the court of appeals or the Supreme
Court to modify the judgment to place it on the determination of prematurity alone. See 28
U.S.C. § 2106 (1976).
7' The appellant also could seek modification of the judgment. See supra note 69.
71 426 F.2d at 106.
1983]
HeinOnline  -- 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 1983
The University of Chicago Law Review
duce appeals purely for the purpose of forestalling an estoppel in
collateral litigation, and the present burden on appellate courts
will result in more than speculative savings in the courts of first
instance. The plaintiff does not ask the court to vacate findings to
avoid estoppel in merely speculative litigation on another claim.
There is but one claim, and it has been decided squarely on its
merits. Further, if the judgment is not a bar, the future litigation is
not exactly speculative. A party who has obtained a judgment es-
tablishing his defense to an action for breach of contract is most
unlikely to just pay up. Thus the second suit is practically foreor-
dained. Moreover, if the court in the second suit should render
judgment for the plaintiff, the score on the matter would be one to
one, and appeal would be almost inevitable.
In sum, there is no unfairness to the plaintiff in disposing of
the case he brought to the court on any ground and all grounds
that were properly presented and fully and fairly litigated. On the
other hand, the inequity to the defendant that would be produced
by the Restatement (Second) formulation is palpable. The plain-
tiff has chosen the time and the place of the suit. He has forced
the defendant to adduce his evidence on all defenses. There has
been a plenary trial and it has been decided that the plaintiff's
claim is without merit. Why, at the plaintiff's option, the defen-
dant should be twice vexed because he has also been vexed early is,
to say the least, obscure.
B. Estoppel Inter Partes
The Restatement (Second)'s application of the "reasoning" of
Halpern v. Schwartz to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or, in
the parlance of the Restatement, "issue preclusion, '7 2 raises many
of the same problems already discussed in connection with its ap-
plication to the doctrine of bar. In some situations, the distinction
is not easy to recognize. In Stebbins v. Keystone Insurance Co.,7 3
the plaintiff brought an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 7 alleging that the defendant had refused him employ-
ment because of his race. Defendant moved for summary judgment
and in support of its motion provided affidavits stating that plain-
tiff had refused to file a written application for employment. It also
relied upon statements in plaintiff's depositions to show that plain-
12 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
73 481 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
7' Pub. L. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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tiff was not qualified for the employment he sought. Plaintiff sub-
mitted no materials in opposition to the motion. The court granted
the motion and filed a memorandum indicating the facts that it
had determined to be beyond triable issue, including the fact that
plaintiff had filed no written application and the fact that he was
not qualified for the position he sought. Plaintiff did not appeal.
Instead, he submitted to defendant a written application, which
was denied, and then filed a new suit. The defendant moved to
dismiss this suit on the ground of res judicata. The motion was
granted, the action was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed. 5
The court of appeals reversed. Judge Leventhal reasoned that
although it was unnecessary to accept the doctrine of Halpern v.
Schwartz as a universal proposition, it should be applied in cir-
cumstances in which one and only one of two independently suffi-
cient determinations would constitute a bar to a second suit.76 He
noted that as a technical matter the second suit was on a different
cause of action, but as a practical matter it was a continuation of
the original litigation." Viewing the suit in this manner, Judge
Leventhal read the judgment as resting on two independently suffi-
cient grounds-failure to apply (which would not bar a second suit
after application and denial) and unemployability (which would). 8
He likened the failure to apply to a failure to exhaust extrajudicial
remedies, which would bar recovery based on the original incident
but would not preclude refiling after exhaustion.
It is not easy to follow Judge Leventhal's reasoning. Having
found it unnecessary to accept the full implications of Halpern v.
Schwartz, he also found it unnecessary to express an opinion on
the Restatement (Second) extension of Halpern to the doctrine of
bar. This left Stebbins suspended precariously between the two.80
75 481 F.2d at 505-06.
s Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
78 Id. at 508.
71 Id. at 509 & n.19.
s0 The filing of a written application is clearly not a statutory prerequisite to a Title
VII suit. And, with deference, the analogy to exhaustion of extrajudicial remedies is thin.
The suit charged refusal to hire in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and if the
determination that plaintiff had refused to file a written application was an independently
sufficient ground for summary judgment at all, it was because refusal to hire could not be
shown without application and denial, or because the flouting of the defendant's personnel
practices supplied a reason for the refusal other than the plaintiff's race. Viewed in this way,
the judgment based on failure to file the application would be as much a judgment on the
merits of the claim as a judgment based on unemployability. It would bar a second action on
the same cause, but of course would not bar an action based upon a later refusal to hire.
The second suit, however, would be a wholly different cause, based on its own facts, and
1983]
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Perhaps the best way to analyze the litigation is to read the first
suit's determination that the plaintiff did not file an application as
establishing that the defendant had not refused to hire him. Since
the defendant could not have denied the plaintiff employment on
the basis of his race if it had not denied him employment at all,
the judgment is on the merits and is a bar to a second action based
on the alleged refusal. The determination that the plaintiff is un-
employable, however, based on after-acquired information gleaned
from the answers to his deposition, deals with the hypothetical
question of whether, were he to apply, there would be reasons
other than race for denying him employment. Viewed in this light
the finding on employability was not an independently sufficient
ground for the judgment on the first claim presented by the plain-
tiff, is unnecessary in the conventional sense, and therefore cannot
bar his second claim.81
Apart from bankruptcy cases like Halpern, which arise in the
context of a single case broken up by statute into a series of inde-
pendent proceedings, and cases like Stebbins, in which the second
action charges a wrong subsequent to judgment in the first, the
rather broad contemporary view of "claim" or "cause of action, 8 2
coupled with the compulsory counterclaim rule,83 limit sharply the
circumstances in which collateral estoppel is pleaded both by and
would not relate back. Since it was adjudged that no wrong was committed, there could be
no "remedies" to exhaust, judicial or extrajudicial. If in such a case a determination in the
first suit of a reason, other than failure to apply, why there was no violation of the statute
does not trigger collateral estoppel in the second suit, it is difficult to distinguish Stebbins
from a total acceptance of Halpern, for no judgment bars (in the sense of res judicata) a
later action based on facts that take place after it is rendered. On the other hand, if the case
is viewed as one in which the first action was premature or dismissed under the exhaustion
doctrine, the case is very difficult to distinguish from the rule set forth in § 20(2) of the
Restatement (Second).
31 The defendant may plead (a) that it did not refuse to hire the plaintiff, and in the
alternative (b) that it refused to hire him for a reason other than his race. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(e)(2). But the fact that he may plead in the alternative does not mean that a judgment
can be based on antithetical alternatives.
S The trend toward a broad definition of claim for res judicata purposes was noted by
the Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of I. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 327 (1971). The Restatement (Second) defines a "claim" for purposes of merger
and bar as "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or
any part of the transaction, or series of related transactions, out of which the action arose."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENns § 24(1) (1980).
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) requires the pleader to plead as a counterclaim "any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim [with limited exceptions]." Thus normally the judgment would bar further litigation
between the same parties in circumstances in which the facts determined in the first action
would control the second.
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against a party to the first action. The most significant area in
which the question arises is, perhaps, the case of serial obligations
arising out of a continuous relationship, such as successive duties
under a continuing contract, or obligations to pay interest install-
ments on a note or redeem interest coupons on a bond. 4 Though
all the obligations arise out of the same transaction, they accrue
over time. Thus, for purposes of the doctrine of merger, at least,
they must be treated as different claims or causes of action. 5 It is
such a case that the Restatement (Second) has selected to exem-
plify the application of the Halpern doctrine to the doctrine of "is-
sue preclusion." Plaintiff sues defendant for an accrued interest in-
stallment on a note. Defendant pleads two defenses: that his
signature on the note was procured by plaintiff's fraud and that
plaintiff has executed a valid and outstanding release of the obliga-
tion to pay interest."6 Under the Restatement (Second) view, a
judgment for the defendant on findings of both fraud and release
ought not to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of
fraud in a later suit against the defendant for the principal sum. 7
In such a case, there is no question of prematurity of the suit
and no choice between a judgment on the merits and a dismissal
without prejudice. The plaintiff's claim is ripe and must be decided
now, and the defense of fraud goes directly to the merits of the
claim. The defendant is under no less compulsion to present his
fraud defense than he is in the case of the premature contract
suit. 8 As in the case of the premature suit, the two defenses are
not easily mixed up, either at trial or on appeal,89 nor is the effect
of the determination of fraud ambiguous.90 The time and place of
the trial have been selected by the plaintiff. He has had fair notice
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGmENTS § 24 comment d (1980).
85 It would be possible, of course, to treat the first breach as accelerating all obligations,
but it would be very inconvenient. The matter is handled by the Restatement (Second)
through a "pragmatic[]" definition of "transaction" and "series of connected transactions,"
which takes into account "whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expec-
tations or business understanding or usage." Id. § 24(2).
86 Id. § 27 comment i, illustration 15.
37 Id.
88 If he omits the fraud defense and loses on the issue of release, he will be cast in
immediate judgment for the interest, which, if the fraud defense is good, he does not owe. If
he omits the defense of release, and loses on the fraud defense, he will be cast for the inter-
est installment and estopped on the issue of fraud in subsequent litigation.
81 The defenses involve different instruments executed at different times and dealing
with different subject matter; it would be next to impossible to confuse them.
90 Fraud in inducing the defendant's signature goes plainly to all obligations under the
instrument, and the circumstances alleged to constitute fraud must be pleadeol with particu-
larity. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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of both defenses and there has been a plenary trial. There appears
to be no reason why the double defense in any way deprives the
plaintiff of his full day in court or should confer on him a reprieve
from issue preclusion.
C. Equitable Defenses
For the reasons stated, if the Halpern-Restatement (Second)
formulation worked in practice as the draftsmen of the Restate-
ment apparently believed it would work, it would be thoroughly
undesirable as applied either to the doctrine of bar or to estoppel
inter partes. In both illustrations given by the Restatement (Sec-
ond), the defendant has pleaded fraud in the inducement as a de-
fense, in the one case as a defense in an action for breach of con-
tract,9 1 in the other as a defense in an action for an interest
installment on a note.92 In either case the defendant could present
his allegation of fraud in an independent suit for rescission or can-
cellation.93 In the federal courts after f915,94 such a claim can be
pleaded as a defense or counterclaim in an action at law, and with
the merger of law and equity under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, it may be so pleaded in a civil action. 5 Accordingly, if the
defendant wishes to be sure that a determination in his favor on
the issue of fraud cannot be relitigated by the plaintiff in a second
action on the same contract or the same note and also wishes to
interpose a defense such as release of the interest obligation, he
can answer, raising both defenses, and identify the fraud defense
as a counterclaim for rescission, cancellation, or declaratory
relief.9
The case of serial obligations is in this respect analogous to a
suit for patent infringement. In such a case a defense of nonin-
fringement, if established, defeats only the plaintiff's claim, while a
defense of invalidity, through the application of collateral estoppel,
would preclude any future suit for infringement. If the defendant
concedes infringement and defends on the ground of invalidity
91 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMNTS § 20 comment e, illustration 4 (1980).
91 Id. § 27 comment i, illustration 15.
3 3 J. PoimBoy, A TREATISE ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 910, at 574 (5th ed. 1941).
" See Act of Mar. 3, 1915, Pub. L. No. 63-278, § 274b, 38 Stat. 956, 956 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 398 (1934) (repealed as unnecessary after adoption of the FED. R. CIv. P.)).
" Indeed, it must be pleaded or lost. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
"See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Where the plaintiff has brought
suit on the contract or note, there is no doubt that there is a sufficient controversy to sus-
tain jurisdictign in an action for declaratory relief. See J. MOORE, 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 57:23 (2d ed. 1982).
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alone, a counterclaim would be redundant and normally would not
be permitted.97 If the defendant pleads both noninfringement and
invalidity, however, he runs the risk that the court might dismiss
for noninfringement and make no finding on the issue of invalidity.
If, therefore, the dispute between the parties extends beyond the
particular infringement alleged in the complaint, the counterclaim
serves a purpose and can be pleaded, and a judgment for the de-
fendant based on a finding of noninfringement does not moot the
counterclaim.98
To return to the Restatement (Second) illustrations, 9 the is-
sue of fraud in the inducement, as a defense to an instrument that
is the fons et origo of the obligation sued upon and that imposes
additional obligations not yet matured, always goes beyond the
particular obligation currently sought to be enforced by the plain-
tiff. By analogy to the patent cases, therefore, the defendant could
always protect against the risk that the court might dismiss on the
ground of release of interest and decline to decide the issue of
fraud merely by labeling the fraud defense as a counterclaim.
If the defendant does identify his fraud defense as a counter-
claim, and judgment is rendered for the defendant on the main
claim on a finding of release of interest and also on the counter-
claim on a finding of fraud, the plaintiff appears to be in substan-
tially the same position in which he would have been had a single
judgment been rendered for the defendant on grounds of both re-
lease and fraud.100 In some respects, under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) rule, he is worse off, for the court of appeals no longer has the
"7 A counterclaim that adds nothing to the answer has been spoken of as "a wholly
redundant flourish." Scruggs v. Casco Corp., 32 F. Supp. 625, 626 (D. Conn. 1940). See J.
MOORE, 3 MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE 1 13.07, at 13-37 & n.6 (2d ed. 1982).
" Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363, 365 (1943). Altvater was a suit in equity for
specific performance of a license agreement, an accounting, and an injunction. The defen-
dant answered pleading invalidity and filed a counterclaim for a declaration that the reissue
patent was invalid, but if held valid the license agreement should be extended to cover it.
The trial court held that there was no infringement, that the agreement had terminated,
and that the reissue patent was invalid. The Eighth Circuit held that in view of the determi-
nation that (1) there was no infringement, and (2) the agreement was terminated, defen-
dant's counterclaim was moot. The Supreme Court reversed. It found that defendant was
manufacturing articles under the former license agreement other than those included in the
charge of infringement, and therefore there remained a live controversy between the parties.
"' ESTATErMEr (SEcoND) OF JuDGMNrs § 20 comment e, illustration 4 (1980); id. § 27
comment i, illustration 15. See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
100 He could appeal from the judgment on the main claim, the judgment on the coun-
terclaim, or from both. Indeed, as a technical matter they would be parts of the same final
judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). There would be no alteration in the issues or in the
posture of the parties.
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option of ignoring the issue of fraud and affirming the judgment
solely on the ground of release. The question arises, then, why it
would be useful to force the identification of the fraud defense as a
counterclaim.
At the trial court level, the distinction between adjudication of
fraud as a defense and as a counterclaim is minimal. Since the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in either case the
facts alleged to constitute fraud must be pleaded with particular-
ity,1"1 the plaintiff would receive no additional information from
the change in label. If the claim of fraud were identified as a coun-
terclaim, the plaintiff would be required to file a reply.1°0 This
might be of some advantage to the defendant, but it does not seem
to aid the plaintiff. 03 In any event, however one assesses the utility
of a reply, it is clear that no reply would be required if solely the
fraud defense were pleaded, and the fact that release of interest
and fraud are pleaded in tandem gives a reply no additional utility.
The only visible argument in favor of requiring identification
as a counterclaim lies in the fact that the estoppel on the judgment
on the counterclaim would be mutual, whereas under conventional
principles, estoppel based on findings would not: in a judgment for
the defendant on the ground of release of the interest obligation, a
finding of no fraud would not support the judgment, and therefore
relitigation of the issue would not be precluded. 04 Arguments for
avoidance of estoppel on the ground of want of mutuality have not
been much in favor in recent years.0 5 Nevertheless, the mutuality
issue arises here in a context that differs in essential respects from
the context of estoppel pleaded by a stranger. In the latter context,
because due process considerations permit only nonmutual estop-
pel or none at all, it might be best to adhere to the mutuality rules.
In the present case, however, one might selectively relax the con-
ventional limitation of estoppel to findings necessary to the judg-
ment, so that neither the defendant nor the plaintiff could reliti-
gate the fraud issue. Without at this writing advocating selective
relaxation, the writer believes that it would be distinctly preferable
101 Id. 9(b).
102 Id. 7(a).
103 The only thing that the reply would add would be a duty of the plaintiff to admit or
deny the allegations of the counterclaim. This might result in some admissions on the part
of the plaintiff.
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980); J. MOORS & T. CURRIER, supra
note 1, 0.443[5].
101 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 320-27 (1971).
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to the Halpern-Restatement (Second) formulation.106
D. Collateral Estoppel Pleaded by Strangers: Defensive Use
To take an example of estoppel pleaded by a stranger to prior
litigation, suppose plaintiff, injured in an intersection collision,
sues the operator of another automobile involved in the collision in
a jurisdiction in which contributory negligence is an absolute de-
fense and in which failure to stop at a stop sign is negligence per
se. After a full trial at which evidence is presented by both sides on
the question of whether plaintiff stopped at a stop sign before pro-
ceeding into the intersection, the jury returns a verdict for the de-
fendant and answers special interrogatories finding that defendant
was not negligent and that plaintiff was negligent in that he did
not stop at the stop sign. No appeal is taken, and plaintiff files a
second suit, this time against the city, alleging negligence in the
placement of a construction sign in a position so as to obstruct the
plaintiff's view of traffic proceeding on the intersecting highway.
The city pleads the first judgment as an estoppel to deny contribu-
tory negligence.
It is unnecessary to discuss in general the merits of permitting
a stranger to the prior litigation to plead collateral estoppel; like
most other recent authority, the Restatement (Second) repudiates
the mutuality requirement.10 7 Assuming that nonmutual estoppel
is justified in any case, this case is close to the beau ideal. The first
action was initiated by the party against whom the estoppel is as-
serted. He chose his adversary, the timing, and the forum. The is-
sue was an essential element in the case. There was a full trial and
it was contested and determined by the jury. The plaintiff had a
right to appeal. The issue is identical in the first and second cases.
The estoppel is pleaded defensively. The plaintiff is simply at-
tempting, by shifting adversaries, to put the same issue before a
106 Such want of mutuality as there is in the case of multiple dispositive findings was
not considered to violate the mutuality requirement even when the requirement was gener-
ally adhered to and may be said to follow logically from the principle that findings made
against a prevailing party are not appealable and do not support an estoppel. See supra
note 9. There is some contrary authority. See, e.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. E.W. Bliss Co.,
285 F.2d 231, 236-37, 239 (6th Cir. 1960). In the special circumstances of an equitable de-
fense that could have been pleaded as a counterclaim, it would make considerable good
sense to permit appeal and hold that the determination is conclusive on both parties. In this
connection it should be noted that if the defense is such as is properly pleaded as a counter-
claim, it is provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) that "the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation."
107 REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF JUDGmENTs § 29 & reporter's note (1980).
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second jury-just the sort of case that gave impetus to the aban-
donment of the mutuality requirement.""8
Turning to the Halpern considerations, unless the issues of
negligence and plaintiff's due care were separated and the issue of
defendant's negligence tried first, determination of plaintiff's due
care would be necessary to the disposition of the cause. The deter-
mination of relative fault is a daily task of courts and juries and a
determination of sole fault does not appear to be any more unrelia-
ble than a determination of mutual fault.
The efficiency considerations that underlay the Halpern deci-
sion and were found to be "of critical importance" by the Restate-
ment (Second) reporters 0 9 are perhaps more recognizable in this
sort of case than they are in the case of serial obligations arising
out of a single instrument or agreement. It is true that if plaintiff
has no ground for appealing the determination that defendant was
not negligent, any appeal he might take can be characterized as
taken for the purpose of relief from a finding that would form the
basis for an estoppel, should he bring a second suit against a differ-
ent defendant. But, as in the case of serial obligations, it cannot be
viewed as merely a hedge against speculative collateral litigation. If
the plaintiff does not believe that he can win on both grounds he
will not appeal unless he intends to cast around for a second ad-
versary. While the necessity to appeal to rid himself of the estop-
pel no doubt adds to the cost of his pursuit of a judgment, and this
cost will be weighed in the balance against his chance of ultimately
prevailing, it is a cost that normally he could have avoided by join-
ing the second adversary in the first suit.
In this connection it is important to note that the Restate-
ment (Second) takes the view that on appeal from a judgment
resting on more than one ground, if the appellate court affirms on
one ground and refuses to reach the others, only the ground on
which the judgment was affirmed will bottom a collateral estop-
pel.110 This position eviscerates the Halpern argument predicated
on the deterrence of appeals. To take the Restatement (Second)
illustration,"" no holder of a note adjudged unenforceable because
of fraud would forgo appeal merely because he fears the appellate
108 See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942). See also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971) (approving the Bernhard abandonment of the mutuality
requirement).
109 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 comment e (1980).
110 Id. § 27 comment o. See supra note 29.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i, illustration 15 (1980).
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court will find release of the interest obligation, unless the princi-
pal sum is not worth the cost of pursuing appeal. Moreover, if ap-
pellate pretermission of the fraud issue would result, in effect, in
vacating the finding of fraud, the only extent to which he may be
said to be discouraged from appealing lies in the cost of appeal
without assurance of a final judgment. But many, if not most, ap-
peals are directed at obtaining reconsideration rather than final
disposition, and the plaintiff in the Restatement (Second) illustra-
tion could in no event obtain a final judgment for the principal
sum of the note because his cause of action has not yet accrued.
Indeed, the Restatement (Second) position on the effect of ap-
pellate disposition appears to turn the Halpern reasoning upside
down. In the Restatement (Second) illustration, if the plaintiff be-
lieves that he can prevail on appeal with respect to the release is-
sue but doubts that he can overturn the determination of fraud, he
will be encouraged to forgo the interest to buy another chance to
litigate fraud. And the less complaint he has about the trial of the
fraud issue, the more attractive this course would be. Similarly, in
our hypothetical tort case, the plaintiff with a good chance of up-
setting the finding of no negligence on the part of the defendant
and a doubtful chance of disturbing the finding of contributory
negligence would be encouraged to forgo appeal and to shift adver-
saries. Thus under Judge Smith's analysis in Halpern, the deter-
rence to appeal lies in the fear that the appellate court might not
reach the ground on which estoppel would be based;112 under the
Restatement (Second) solution, it lies in the fear that it might.
The more correct and unassailable this ground is, the more likely it
is that the plaintiff will disconnect and start over.
Unlike the case of estoppel inter partes, in which the defen-
dant's self-interest assures that he will not ignore on appeal the
ground that will have the broader effect, the case of estoppel in
subsequent actions with strangers does exemplify Judge Smith's
concern over the want of truly adversary posture on appeal. If, in
our case, the plaintiff should concede defendant's want of negli-
gence and brief and argue only the issue of his own due care, the
defendant would have scant incentive to argue the issue.
But also unlike the case of estoppel inter partes, which serves
to protect the parties from the necessity to relitigate issues that
have been adjudicated between them, the extension of collateral
estoppel to litigation with persons not party to the first record is
"' Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1970).
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based largely on system convenience. If a stranger is denied the
benefit of an estoppel, he is not twice vexed or required to reliti-
gate any issue; he must simply make his defense in the same fash-
ion in which he would have made it had he been sued first. Thus
the extension of collateral estoppel to litigation with strangers
serves mainly the public policy of reducing litigation.'18 It proceeds
on the principle that one full and fair opportunity to litigate an
issue is all that fairness requires and all the system can afford. 114
Any want of adversary posture in an appeal from a finding of
plaintiff's want of due care does not impair his full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate; the absence of argument in opposition would in-
ure purely to his benefit. But since the extension of estoppel to
such cases rests largely on the ground of savings to the system,
arguably it should not be carried into areas in which no savings can
be realized. Thus if it is true that its application to multiple find-
ings would produce such a volume of appeals taken purely in prep-
aration for litigation with strangers as might be expected to cancel
out any savings, it might be sensible to preserve the mutuality re-
quirement in this particular instance.
Calculus of this sort is necessarily speculative, but it appears
quite unlikely that the extension of the conventional rule regarding
multiple sufficient findings to defensive estoppel pleaded by a
stranger would produce any appreciable volume of appeals that
would not be taken in any event. The circumstances in which the
question can arise are limited to cases in which (1) the plaintiff's
claim contains two elements, each necessary to recovery, one of
which is related only to the present claim and the other of which is
related to that claim and a potential claim of the plaintiff against
another defendant, and the plaintiff fails to establish either ele-
ment, or (2) the defendant pleads two defenses in the same fashion
to the present claim of the plaintiff and a potential claim against
another defendant, and the defendant establishes both defenses.
Further, if both determinations are vulnerable on appeal the plain-
tiff can be expected to appeal and if the common determination is
not vulnerable, he can be expected to acquiesce in the judgment
and pursue the matter no further. Thus cases in which the plaintiff
would seek to overturn a finding without seeking reversal of the
judgment on the original claim are necessarily limited to those in
which the individual element or defense is unassailable and the
n1 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328
& n.18 (1971).
114 Id.
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common one vulnerable. Such cases do not arise very often.115
Under the Restatement (Second) formulation, to avoid this largely
academic problem, the plaintiff would be permitted to relitigate
the common element or defense against any number of blameless
defendants so long as he continued to lose on both issues. Such a
rule would plainly discourage joinder of defendants, which ought
to be encouraged, and encourage dogged pursuit of a hopeless
claim, which ought to be discouraged.
In formulating the Restatement (Second) position, the report-
ers referred to the matter as "difficult," and conceded that case by
case analysis would reveal cases in which a balancing of the consid-
erations would point to estoppel, but went on to suggest that in
most instances the question would be close, and therefore ex-
pressed a preference for the certainty of a uniform rule.111 This
approach is, of course, squarely opposed to most modern-day de-
velopments in the area of collateral estoppel, and indeed to the
general cast of the Restatement (Second) itself.117 In cases in
which the plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to liti-
gate an issue, the determination of the issue, under modern doc-
trine, does not constitute an estoppel in an action on a different
claim or cause of action.1 8 And in the case of a judgment in the
federal courts, at least, any inability to obtain appellate review is a
factor to be taken into consideration in determining what is full
and fair.119 There may be cases of multiple independently suffi-
cient holdings that fall outside the boundaries of what is full and
fair opportunity, and some cases may be "close." But with the gen-
eral shift to consideration of individual cases, to pick out this re-
mote little corner as requiring the certainty and predictability of a
uniform rule borders on the whimsical.
E. Collateral Estoppel Pleaded by Strangers: Offensive Use
In many jurisdictions, including the federal, collateral estoppel
may be pleaded by a stranger in support of a claim against a party
In Halpern v. Schwartz, Judge Smith, after "an exhaustive search," found three
cases between 1866 and 1970 which he took to be directly on point. 426 F.2d at 107 n.4.
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980).
MSee, e.g., §§ 28(5), 29(8) (suggesting a balancing approach is often necessary).
118 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-50
(1971).
I" See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 & n.18 (1980). The Restatement
(Second) states that a legal right to appeal or other form of appellate review should be a
precondition to "issue preclusion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(1) (1980).
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to the prior litigation.120 The Restatement (Second) supports this
view.12 1 The further one departs from the original limitations im-
posed upon collateral estoppel, however, the more attenuated are
the arguments for its application. In adopting the position that a
stranger may make offensive use of a judgment in his subsequent
suit against a party, the Supreme Court recognized that such an
extension of the doctrine would give rise to cases in which the
party to the litigation had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,
but in which nevertheless it would be unfair to preclude relitiga-
tion.122 It found, however, that on balance it was better generally
to adopt the doctrine of offensive use of estoppel by strangers and
emphasize the broad discretion of the district courts to permit re-
litigation in circumstances in which the preclusion would be un-
fair. 1 23 The courts have recognized that the nature of a determina-
tion as one of multiple independent bases for the judgment is a
factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the district
court's discretion.
In Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co.,12 4 the defendant employer noti-
fied the employees in certain job classifications that it had intro-
duced a new retirement plan. Under the new plan, the employee,
upon reaching the age of sixty, would be put on inactive status.
From then until his full retirement at sixty-five, the employee,
under the terms of inactive status, would remain available for spe-
cial assignments, but would be permitted to accept other employ-
ment deemed by the defendant not to be competitive with its busi-
ness. During this period the employee would receive half the
amount of his previous salary.12 5 One employee, who was fifty-
seven at the time the new plan was announced, at the instruction
of the defendant trained his successor and paid his successor a por-
tion of his own salary. Six months before the employee's sixtieth
birthday, defendant sold the division for which the employee
worked and terminated his employment. The employee accepted
employment with the new owner, but was required to retire at
sixty-two. The employee sued the defendant and the new owner.
The court dismissed the claim against the new owner but entered
"0 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1971). The Court chose "not to
preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to
determine when it should be applied." Id.
"" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment b (1980).
1'2 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1971).
123 Id. at 331.
124 662 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981).
1'5 For a comprehensive discussion of the retirement plan, see id. at 1159-60.
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judgment against defendant. The judgment was rendered on the
ground that the notice of the new retirement plan had the effect of
changing the at-will employment of the plaintiff into a contract of
employment for the five-year period between ages sixty and sixty-
five, and the termination of plaintiff's employment constituted a
breach of the contract. The court also rendered judgment on the
ground that plaintiff's training his successor and paying his succes-
sor out of his own pocket constituted injurious reliance. The defen-
dant did not appeal.126
Subsequently fourteen other employees who had been termi-
nated prior to their sixtieth birthdays sued defendant for breach of
contract. After some vacillation the district court entered summary
judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that the defendant was
estopped to deny the existence of a bilateral contract arising out of
the notice of the plan and its acceptance. 127 The court of appeals
held that under the total circumstances the court's refusal to per-
mit reexamination of the bilateral contract theory constituted an
abuse of discretion. It rejected the contention that collateral estop-
pel was not applicable to questions of law,128 declined to hold that
the fact alone that a decision is rendered on behalf of a particu-
larly attractive plaintiff precludes an estoppel, '12 and did not adopt
the Restatement (Second) rule of multiple grounds.130 In the in-
stant case, however, the court refused to impose estoppel. It found
that the claim of the plaintiff in the previous case, who had been
terminated only six months before his sixtieth birthday, was a par-
ticularly sympathetic one. Further, his claim was for about
$35,000, whereas the second case involved in excess of $400,000.
Finally, the holding in the first case was an alternative theory of
liability, and the plaintiffs in the second action were strangers to
the first litigation.131 These circumstances taken together, the
"16 Id. at 1161-62.
217 Id. at 1162-65.
"8 Id. at 1166-67. The facts in the case were not in dispute. In the first case, the court
read the defendant's letter as unambiguous. The court of appeals in Hicks disagreed with
this reading and indicated that on remand the court should permit the introduction of ex-
trinsic evidence on this subject. Id. at 1175-76.
" Id. at 1172.
130 Id. at 1168-70.
" Id. at 1171-72. While the court did not commit itself to the Restatement (Second)
rule in general, it found that the application of the rule is particularly appropriate in the
case of offensive collateral estoppel by a stranger. It then proceeded to discuss the circum-
stances in terms of the "fairness" principles that form the basis for the exercise of discretion
under the Parklane decision, noting that the alternative character of the holding "bol-
stered" the argument of unfairness. Id. at 1170.
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court of appeals reasoned,3 2 were enough to demonstrate unfair-
ness in the use of estoppel within the discretionary rule laid down
by the Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. s3
The Hicks case no doubt falls within the "broad discretion" to
deny the offensive use of estoppel by a stranger confirmed in Park-
lane. Moreover, the alternative nature of the holding asserted as
an estoppel is, under the circumstances, an important feature of
any unfairness that can be said to exist.34 The court properly re-
jected the argument that collateral estoppel could not be applied
because the issue was one of law.3 5 Yet the character of the issue
is not wholly irrelevant. The fact that injurious reliance was proved
and held to be an independent consideration rendered the holding
that the letter announcing the new retirement plan constituted an
offer for a bilateral contract, which plaintiff accepted by continued
employment, strangely hypothetical.136 The case in which the judg-
ment rests on independent factual determinations is a different
one. In our earlier hypothetical of seriatim actions for personal in-
jury,13 7 for example, suppose that after a determination that the
defendant was negligent and the plaintiff was not proceeding with
due care, the operator of a third car should sue the plaintiff for
injuries arising out of the same accident, and the plaintiff should
deny that he failed to stop at the stop sign. The argument for per-
12 Id. at 1171-73.
' 439 U.S. 322 (1971); see supra note 5.
114 There were three classes of employees involved in the overall dispute. There were
those who had reached 60 on the day the division was sold. There was the plaintiff in the
first case, who was six months from his sixtieth birthday and had trained his successor,
paying his successor from his own funds. And there were others who had not yet reached 60.
It was defendant's contention that the term "eligible employee" in the letter announcing the
program referred to persons who had reached 60 at the time the business was sold. 662 F.2d
at 1175. Defendant conceded its liability to them and they do not figure in the litigation.
The plaintiff in the first case had prevailed on the issue of injurious reliance. The judgment
was for $35,000. The plaintiff had no interest in the basis of the judgment and could neither
lose nor gain any advantage by its disposition on appeal. If the defendant appealed and
conceded the alternative remedy, therefore, there was a distinct possibility that the appeal
would be dismissed as moot. See supra note 64. Thus to obtain review of the holding on the
bilateral contract ruling, the defendant would have had to brief and argue both issues, and
if he won on the contract issue, the plaintiffs in the second suit, not having been parties,
would not have been bound by the decision. Thus the considerations that Judge Smith dis-
cussed in Halpern do weigh against an estoppel. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying
text.
:35 662 F.2d at 1166-67 (discussing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979)).
16 Since the plaintiff in the first action presented a case factually distinct from the
plaintiffs in the second action, and the facts were not in dispute, it was unnecessary to
determine whether the plaintiff in the first action would have prevailed had some of the
facts in this case been different.
137 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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mitting the estoppel would be compelling. In the Hicks case, the
facts were fixed and the second court applied a broader reading of
the law than was necessary to support the judgment. In the hypo-
thetical, the facts were necessarily determined and the plaintiff
seeks simply to play roulette with the jury.
In sum, while the application of the Restatement (Second)
rule on multiple grounds would be easier to justify in cases in
which a stranger seeks to use estoppel to establish his claim, the
"broad discretion" to deny estoppel in such circumstances makes
such a rule unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Halpern v. Schwartz3 8 was decided in 1970, a year before the
marked shift in federal cases in the direction of analysis of collat-
eral estoppel as a matter of full and fair opportunity to litigate.
The rule in Halpern was unnecessarily broad, and the considera-
tions recited in its justification plainly not universally present. To
the extent the case was intended to state a universal rule to be
applied mechanically to multiple determinations each sufficient to
support the judgment, it was later confined to its facts in the cir-
cuit in which it was decided,139 and has been approached with
great caution elsewhere. To the extent that it dealt with the special
problem of successive proceedings under sections 3a, 60, 70, and
14(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, its significance died in
1978.140 Unfortunately, there was a star-crossed love affair between
the Restatement (Second) and Halpern. The Halpern "reasoning"
was embraced with unflagging fervor and applied to produce a for-
mulation covering not only collateral estoppel across the
board-inter partes and with strangers, defensive and offen-
sive-but was extended to bar as well as estoppel. As applied to
the doctrine of bar, application of the Restatement (Second) for-
mulation would be inefficient, often patently unfair, and would in-
troduce uncertainty where certainty is crucial. As applied to collat-
eral estoppel between parties to the original litigation, in the very
illustration given in the Restatement (Second) it would produce
little more than a pleading trap, but to the extent that it had any
426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970).
130 See Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1154 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944
(1977).
04 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
Title 11 of U.S.C. (Supp. V. 1981)), revised Title 11 of the United States Code. The reform
act took effect on October 1, 1979. See 11 U.S.C.A. preface (West Supp. 1982).
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further effect it would involve the same inefficiency and unfairness
that it would have in its application to the doctrine of bar. As ap-
plied to the defensive use of estoppel by a stranger, it would
merely preserve an odd little corner of the mutuality doctrine
without special justification. In the case of offensive use by a stran-
ger, though the fact that the first judgment rests on two indepen-
dent grounds may be a factor in the discretion to reject the use of
estoppel, the Restatement (Second) "uniform rule" is both unnec-
essary and out of keeping with the Supreme Court's resolution of
the problem in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.141
141 439 U.S. 322 (1978).
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